Tourism stocks in times of crises: An econometric investigation of unexpected non-macroeconomic factors by Zopiatis, Anastasios et al.
ISSN: 2341-2356 
 
WEB DE LA COLECCIÓN: http://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2/documentos-de-trabajo-del-icaeWorking 
papers are in draft form and are distributed for discussion. It may not be reproduced without permission of the author/s.  
 
 
Instituto 
Complutense 
 de Análisis 
Económico 
 Tourism Stocks in Times of Crises: An Econometric 
Investigation of Unexpected Non-macroeconomic Factors 
 
   Anastasios Zopiatis 
Department of Hotel and Tourism ManagementSchool of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Christos S. Savva 
Department of Commerce, Finance and Shipping School of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Neophytos Lambertides 
Department of Commerce, Finance and Shipping School of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Michael McAleer  
Department of Quantitative Finance National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan 
And Discipline of Business Analytics University of Sydney Business School, Australia  
And Econometric Institute Erasmus School of Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands and 
Department of Quantitative Economics  Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
and Institute of Advanced Sciences  Yokohama National University, Japan 
 
Abstract 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, the European media emphatically pronounced that billions of 
Euros were wiped from tourism related stocks. The theoretical relationship of the industry with such 
unexpected non-macro incidents received moderate academic coverage. Nevertheless, the quantifiable 
impact of such events on tourism-specific stock values, both in terms of returns and volatility, is still a barren 
landscape. Using econometric methodology, the paper investigates the reaction of five hospitality/tourism 
stock indices to 150 incidents depicting major Acts of Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts in the 21st 
Century. Empirical findings underscore the effect of such incidents on hospitality/tourism stock indices, with 
distinctive differences among the different types, the specificities of each event, and the five regions under 
investigation.  This paper contributes to the extant literature and enhances our conceptual capital pertaining 
to the industry’s current financial practices that are related to stock performance and behavior. 
 
Keywords           Unexpected Non-macroeconomic Factors, Stock Market, Event Study, Econometric 
Modeling.    
JEL Classification         C21, C58, G01, H12, Z32. 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSIDAD 
COMPLUTENSE 
MADRID 
 
 
 
Working Paper nº 1716 
June,  2017 
 Tourism Stocks in Times of Crises: An Econometric Investigation  
of Unexpected Non-macroeconomic Factors* 
 
 
Anastasios Zopiatis 
Department of Hotel and Tourism Management 
School of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Christos S. Savva 
Department of Commerce, Finance and Shipping 
School of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Neophytos Lambertides 
Department of Commerce, Finance and Shipping 
School of Business and Economics 
Cyprus University of Technology 
 
Michael McAleer 
Department of Quantitative Finance 
National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan 
and 
Discipline of Business Analytics 
University of Sydney Business School 
and 
Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
and 
Department of Quantitative Economics 
Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
and 
Institute of Advanced Sciences 
Yokohama National University, Japan 
 
 
 
 
Revised: June 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
* For financial support, the fourth author acknowledges the Australian Research Council and 
the National Science Council, Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. 
1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, the European media emphatically pronounced 
that billions of Euros were wiped from tourism related stocks. The theoretical relationship of 
the industry with such unexpected non-macro incidents received moderate academic 
coverage. Nevertheless, the quantifiable impact of such events on tourism-specific stock 
values, both in terms of returns and volatility, is still a barren landscape. Using econometric 
methodology, the paper investigates the reaction of five hospitality/tourism stock indices to 
150 incidents depicting major Acts of Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts in the 21st 
Century. Empirical findings underscore the effect of such incidents on hospitality/tourism 
stock indices, with distinctive differences among the different types, the specificities of each 
event, and the five regions under investigation.  This paper contributes to the extant literature 
and enhances our conceptual capital pertaining to the industry’s current financial practices 
that are related to stock performance and behavior.  
 
Keywords: Unexpected Non-macroeconomic Factors, Stock Market, Event Study, 
Econometric Modeling.    
 
JEL: C21, C58, G01, H12, Z32. 
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1. Introduction 
 
November 13, 2015.  Paris came under attack from radical Islamists, resulting in the 
death of 130 individuals from at least 26 countries. The perpetrators, believed to be ISIS 
related, deliberately attacked sport, leisure and entertainment venues, all related to the 
tourism industry, in their attempt to cause mass casualties and strike fear into the heart of 
Europe. The following day, financial markets suffered extensive losses, with estimates 
suggesting that more than €2bn had been wiped off European travel and hotel shares 
(Wearden and Allen 2015). A similar scenario was repeated immediately following the 
March 22, 2016 attacks at the Zaventem International Airport and the Maelbeek subway 
station in Brussels, again tourism related targets, with European stocks experiencing more 
heavy losses (Smout 2016).  
 
Both events demonstrated the diachronic vulnerability of tourism related stocks to 
unexpected non-macro incidents which, for the purposes of the paper, encompass acts of 
Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts. Unfortunately, the values and norms governing 
day-to-day tourism operations, along with its global exposure and volatile response qualities, 
portray the industry as a ‘convenient’ target for such incidents. Furthermore, the post-event 
generated global coverage, fueled in recent times by the 24-hour news media frenzy, the 
Internet, and social networks, provides unprecedented publicity to such events, thereby 
influencing geostrategic interests, regional and global policies and, of vital importance to the 
tourism industry, travel attitudes and behavior.  Moreover, the probable impact of such 
incidents severely affects the economics of tourism, with ramifications for financial 
institutions, individual investors, industry operators, and tourists. Nonetheless, despite the 
acknowledged importance, the specificities of this vulnerability are still a barren landscape, 
thereby necessitating the full attention of tourism stakeholders. 
 
 Unequivocally, the reaction of financial markets to unexpected non-macro incidents is 
a contemporary topic worthy of empirical investigation, especially for the tourism industry.  
Nonetheless, a quick foray into the most popular academic databases reveals the scarcity of 
studies measuring the effects of non-macro incidents on financial markets, in general, and the 
hospitality and tourism related stocks and indices, in particular (Chen et al. 2007; Drakos 
2004; Leong and Hui 2014). Some notable attempts to investigate tourism-related topics, 
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mostly in the sphere of macro-incidents (see Chen 2011; Chen, Jang, and Kim 2007; Zheng, 
Farrish, and Kitterlin 2016) are noted. Nevertheless, they fail to respond convincingly to a 
number of questions surrounding the behavior and reaction of hospitality and tourism-
specific stock indices following major unexpected non-macro incidents. 
 
The extant business literature informs us that the exposure and reaction of market-
specific stock sectors may differ according to the characteristics of the event and the region, 
and the idiosyncrasies of the specific industry (Aslam and Kang 2015; Chesney, Reshetarb, 
and Karamana 2011; Enders and Sandler 2012). Indicatively, Aslam and Kang (2015) suggest 
that the susceptibility, exposure and reaction of market-specific stock sectors to pertinent 
incidents deviates according to the type, strength and perceived repercussions of the event. In 
support of this argument, Chesney et al. (2011) reveal that the insurance and airline industry 
sectors are more vulnerable to terrorism, whereas the banking sector is mostly affected by 
financial downturns.  The authors argue that financial markets react differently to 
unpredictable natural catastrophes (Acts of God) as compared with terrorism-related 
incidents, especially in the post-event period. 
 
Echoing a similar reasoning, Brounrn and Derwall (2010) posited that industries that 
are directly affected by an incident (for example, the airline industry in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York) exhibit stronger reactions that may not be 
adequately portrayed in generic market indices. Moreover, Essaddam and Karagianis (2014) 
introduce a regional aspect to the ‘equation’ by suggesting a paradigm shift which focuses on 
the investigation of specific sectors, rather than following the norm of investigating the 
overall stock market’s sentiment, such as the effect on the FTSE 100 index (Chen (2007)).   
 
Such investigations capture the uniqueness of each economic sector and enable 
meaningful comparisons that are of importance to investors, between industries and/or 
regions, especially during and following an event or incident. Motivated by this reasoning, 
the paper hypothesizes that the well-established unique features of the hospitality and tourism 
industry, emanating from its enhanced exposure, vulnerability and direct involvement with 
unexpected non-macro incidents, may trigger a different pattern of stock price movement 
(returns and volatility), as compared with other industries, that is worthy of empirical 
investigation. 
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There is another subtext that cannot be ignored.  The majority of existing studies that 
examine the effects of unexpected non-macro incidents on general financial markets are 
limited, both in terms of the number of cases that are investigated and/or stock market 
locations/regions that are covered. More precisely, some studies investigate the effect of only 
a handful of incidents on financial markets (see Chesney et al. 2011; Johnston and Nedelescu 
2006; Kolias et al. 2011; Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010), with the September 11 (2001), 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks being the most ‘popular’. Others (Aslam and Kang 
2015; Chen 2007; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Leong and Hui 2014) investigate the impact of 
numerous incidents on either one regional market (for example, the Pakistani Stock Market), 
or on a generic index, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (see Chen and Siems 2004).   
 
In contrast, this paper, which has been influenced by the recent work of Hobbs, 
Schaupp and Gingrich (2016), aims to enhance the existing conceptual capital by 
investigating, using a conditional volatility model specification, specifically GJR and 
GARCH, the reaction of five hospitality/tourism stock indices to one hundred and fifty (150), 
manually compiled, unexpected non-macro incidents of the 21st Century. The use of GJR and 
GARCH models, an original approach for such an under-studied tourism-related topic, 
enables the control for multivariate spillovers/effects among the five indices. The inclusion of 
additional variables enhances our collective understanding by addressing pertinent questions, 
such as whether the characteristics of each incident affect stock reaction (returns) and 
volatility (uncertainty) (see McAleer 2015), as well as the specificities surrounding the post-
event recovery period.   
 
The empirical findings of the paper suggest that unexpected non-macro incidents 
cause a short-term transitory effect on hospitality/tourism stock indices, with distinctive 
differences among the different types of incidents, and the five regions under investigation. 
Furthermore, the specificities of each incident, as depicted by numerous variables, influence 
its overall impact on both stock market returns and volatility, whereas the empirical findings 
provide new insights as to the volatility persistence of such events. These empirical findings, 
which are of substantial importance to stakeholders, especially to hospitality and tourism 
stock investors, a vital constituent to the industry’s sustainable development initiatives (Mao 
and Gu 2007), could pave the way for meaningful contributions and interventions to current 
financial practices that are related to stock performance and behavior, risk adjustment and 
portfolio diversification. 
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 The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review, including tourism and incidents of instability, non-macro incidents and stock 
behavior, and econometrics and pertinent studies. Section 3 presents the methodology, while 
Section 4 discusses the econometric methods, including the impact of various events on 
returns and volatility. Section 5 discusses the descriptive statistics and empirical results, as 
well as the answers to a variety of questions and hypotheses. Section 6 raises several issues 
relating to implications of the empirical findings for the tourism and hospitality industry. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Tourism and Incidents of Instability  
 
The multidimensional relationship of the two polar extremes of cultural activity, 
tourism and instability, has received extensive scholarly attention (Theocharous 2010), with 
Sönmez (1998) arguing that targeting tourists, a ‘soft target’, is a deliberate act that helps 
achieve specific predetermined objectives. Historically, terrorism surfaced as the industry’s 
primary ‘adversary’, with a multitude of terrorist groups targeting its superstructure and 
infrastructure as a vital mean to promote their own ideological agendas. In the 1960’s, the 
European continent experienced severe forms of transnational terrorism attributed to the rise 
of numerous Marxist/Leninist extremist groups, whereas in the Middle-East the issue of 
Palestine instigated the rise of groups (for example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine), which used aircraft hijackings extensively in their revolutionary struggles. During 
that turbulent period, airports, commercial aircraft, hotels, public mass transportation 
systems, restaurants, cruise liners, leisure venues, and nightclubs, became ‘ideal targets of 
choice’, with attacks causing a severe loss of human lives, including innocent bystanders and 
tourists (Drakos and Kutan 2003; Sönmez 1998).      
    
On the eve of the 21st Century, and following the end of the Cold War in 1991, the 
global community experienced the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, with Al Qaeda 
orchestrating, a decade later, the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, with 
detrimental effects for the tourism industry (Goodrich 2002). This group, responsible for 
hundreds of attacks which destabilized the Middle East and other regions of the World for 
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almost a decade, was gradually restrained, following two major War conflicts (Iraq, 2003-
2011, and Afghanistan 2001-2014), and the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, in 2011. 
Following Al Qaeda’s demise, the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) has surfaced 
as the most formidable terrorist group in recent times.  
 
By espousing an ultra-radical ideology based on an extremist interpretation of Islam, 
which promotes religious violence, the Islamic State (IS) is responsible for numerous 
barbaric acts to terrorism, most of which have directly targeted tourists. Attacks directed by 
and/or linked to the Islamic State include, among others, the Paris attacks (November 13, 
2015), the Tunisia Beach resort attack (June 26, 2015), which cost an estimated $515 million 
in lost revenues (Cadavez 2016), and the downing of a Russian passenger jet over Sinai, 
Egypt (October 31, 2015) which killed 224 tourists who were departing from their vacations 
from Sharm el Sheikh. The attack outside the popular Red Sea resort had an estimated 
revenue loss of $843 million in just the first three months following the incident (Kholaif 
2015). 
 
Besides terrorist incidents, tourism suffered severely through unanticipated ‘Acts of 
God’ and pandemics (for example, SARS), and other incidents, such as War conflicts and 
economic crises. Notable 21st Century ‘Acts of God’ include the earthquakes in Chūetsu, 
Japan (2004), Christchurch, New Zealand (2011), and Nepal (2015), and the devastating 
tsunamis in the Indian Ocean (2004) and Tōhoku, Japan (2011). With regard to War conflicts, 
the 21st Century experienced major conflicts in Afghanistan (2001-2014), Iraq (2003-2011), 
Lebanon (2006), Georgia (2008), and Syria (2011 - present). The extant literature suggests 
that such unexpected incidents negatively affect the ‘economics’ of tourism in a multitude of 
ways, since the pure essence of the industry, unfortunately, makes it a ‘probable first 
casualty’ in such eventualities.  
 
Indicatively, Chen et al. (2007) suggest that the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) epidemic outbreak of 2003 caused an approximate 29% decline in Taiwanese hotel 
stock prices, whereas the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami caused the death of 300,000 
individuals, including thousands of Western tourists, at an estimated economic cost of $10 
billion (Sharpley 2005). Similarly, with regard to War conflicts, Schneider and Troeger 
(2006) reported an overall negative effect on financial markets, although they do clarify that 
“…even in an increasingly integrated world economy, not all international crises affect the 
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stock markets in the same way” (p. 642).  In terms of financial crises, numerous studies 
(Chen 2007; Chen, Kim, and Kim 2005) have investigated the impact of macro variables on 
hotel stock returns, with Brent Ritchie, Molinar and Frechtling (2010) suggesting the 
enhanced vulnerability of the industry during economic recessions as compared with other 
economic sectors.   
 
Responding to the urgent need for conceptual clarity, scholars have investigated the 
relationship between tourism and instability incidents, with an emphasis on terrorism, from 
an array of different perspectives. Aligned with the characteristics and narrative of each era, 
scholars have measured the impact and effect of events for the industry (Enders, Sandler, and 
Parise 1992; Saha and Yap 2014), developed destination-recovery strategies (Blake and 
Sinclair 2003), proposed destination-image restoration tactics (Avraham 2013), introduced 
holistic strategic disaster/crises management approaches (Mansfeld 1999), and propounded 
destination-specific anti-terrorism strategies (Paraskevas and Arendell 2007).  
 
2.2 Non-Macro Incidents and Stock Behavior 
 
Scholars who are investigating the impact of shocks on stock markets classify incidents into 
macro and non-macro, with the first being more ‘popular’ in research endeavors. As 
suggested by Chen (2007, p. 992), macro variables “…generally consist of industrial 
production growth rate, inflation rate, growth rate of money supply, yield spread, changes in 
unemployment rate, growth rate of imports and changes in exchange rates.”  In contrast, non-
macro variables encompass, among others, mega-sporting events, financial crises, natural 
disasters, Wars, and terrorist attacks (Chen 2007; Cheng, Tzeng, and Kang 2011). As noted 
by a number of scholars (Cheng et al. 2011; Leong and Hui 2014), non-macro incidents can 
be classified into two distinctive categories, namely expected and unexpected.  Expected non-
macro incidents include major scheduled events, such as the Olympic Games and Presidential 
elections, whereas unexpected non-macro incidents include natural disasters, outbreaks of 
infectious diseases, and terrorist attacks.   
         
The generic business literature, exploring the impact of non-macro incidents 
associated with terrorism and natural catastrophes on financial markets, has reached a 
consensus in suggesting the existence of an adverse effect (Arin, Ciferri, and Spagnolo 2008; 
Charles and Darne 2006; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010). Despite the 
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fact that the negative direction of the relationship is unambiguous, the externalities of the 
event’s magnitude and the post-event recovery period are contested issues. Indicatively, 
Chesney et al. (2011) suggested that two-thirds of the terrorists’ attacks investigated in their 
study caused a significant negative effect on stock markets. Charles and Darne (2006) argued 
that the shock, both permanent and temporary, is extensive, whereas Brounrn and Derwall 
(2010) posited that terrorist attacks produce mildly negative price effects on stock market 
prices.  It is, therefore, prudent to conclude that methodological heterogeneities, the 
characteristics of the economic sector under investigation, the specificities of the actual event, 
and the target-destination idiosyncrasies, influence the overall impact, a notion that is 
supported by Essaddam and Karagianis (2014).      
 
 The stock market’s recovery period following an incident has also captured the 
attention of scholars. Overall, research suggests that such incidents cause drastic, but short-
term transitory effects on stock markets, especially on the first day, with recovery in most 
cases occurring within two days (Brounrn and Derwall 2010; Chesney et al. 2011; Drakos 
2010). By contrasting the stock behavior following the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London 
(2005), Kollias, Papadaumou and Stagiannis (2011) suggested that recovery may be affected 
by both the type of attack, and the promptness and adequacy of the country’s institutional 
responses, an argument that is supported by Aslam and Kang (2015).  
 
Countries whose financial institutions were equipped with informed contingency 
plans were able to mitigate the negative effects of such incidents (Kollias et al. 2011), with 
the United Kingdom being a perfect example, following the 2005 London bombings. The 
same scholars argued that contingency plans, developed in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks in New York, involving the vast majority of the country’s financial 
stakeholders, helped mitigate the negative effects, thereby ensuring smooth trading in the 
United Kingdom financial markets. With regard to volatility, the literature suggests a 
significant increase for up to 15 days following the incident (Drakos 2004; Essaddam and 
Karagianis 2014), with some suggesting that this effect is larger in emerging markets (Arin et 
al. 2008).     
   
The incident’s specific characteristics have surfaced as a vital element of stock market 
reaction. Indicatively, Brounrn and Derwall (2010) suggested that terrorism incidents have a 
greater economic impact, especially on the day of the event, compared with unanticipated 
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natural catastrophes, whereas Chesney et al. (2011) argued that the latter exhibit longer post-
event impact due to the delay in measuring their actual catastrophic effects. Moreover, Aslam 
and Kang (2015) posited that the location, type, intensity (measured by the number of 
fatalities), and tactics of the attack affect stock market behavior, whereas Essaddam and 
Karagianis (2014) argued that the geographic location in which the attack occurred 
influenced its overall impact.  
 
By comparing the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), Kollias et al. (2011) 
suggested that London’s market was able to rebound faster due to the fact that the attackers 
were suicide bombers, so that the imminent security danger ceased to exist. From a different 
perspective, Zussman and Zussman (2006) argued that markets react differently to Israeli’s 
controversial policy of assassinating Palestinian political and military leaders, with the first 
causing strong negative reactions, while Eldor and Melnick (2004) suggested that Palestinian 
attacks on transport infrastructure caused a transitory effect on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
(TASE).                  
 
In the tourism arena, a handful of notable studies has been conducted by Ming-Hsiang 
Chen, mostly in the Chinese, Japanese and Taiwanese business settings. His conceptual 
reasoning, which revolved around the investigation of macroeconomic and non-
macroeconomic variables, particularly hotel performance measurements, profitability, and 
stock performance (Chen 2007; 2011), was an extension of Barrows and Naka’s (1994) 
seminal work, which investigated the influence of macroeconomic variables on restaurant and 
hotel stock returns of companies in the USA.  Espousing a similar reasoning, Wong and Song 
(2006) exemplified the dependence of hospitality stock indices in the USA on 
macroeconomic variables, with interest rates being the most significant. Chen, Agrusa, 
Krumwiede and Lu (2012) explored the influences on hotel stock returns in Japan, whereas 
Leong and Hui (2014) investigated pertinent topics in Singapore.  
 
Non-macro incidents has received considerably less attention in the tourism academic 
community, with a handful of studies narrowly confined in mostly regional investigations, 
using only few incidents, and mostly with the reasoning of comparing their effects with 
macro events. The study by Chen et al. (2005) in Taiwan revealed that non-macro events 
have a significant impact on hotel stock returns, which in most cases was more powerful 
compared with the effect of the macro-economic variables under investigation, a premise that 
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is also supported by others (see Cheng et al. 2011; Leong and Hui 2014). With regard to non-
macro events, Chen et al. (2005) posit that expected incidents positively influence stock 
returns, whereas unexpected exhibit a more powerful adverse effect. Along the same lines, 
Chiang and Kee’s (2009, p. 11) study in Singapore theorized that unexpected non-macro 
incidents are “…important determinants of hotel stock returns… (with) much stronger 
explanatory power in explaining hotel stock returns compared to the macroeconomic 
variables”.   
 
It is important to acknowledge that mixed or inconclusive results pertaining to non-
macro investigations have been reported in the literature. Indicatively, Leong and Hui (2014) 
were unable to support a positive association between expected non-macro events and stock 
returns, whereas Chen (2007) suggested that an event might have a completely opposite 
effect on stock returns in different markets due to regional or national characteristics. 
Apparently, and as supported by Chen (2007), the effects of macro events are more distinct 
and clear as compared with non-macro events, with the latter being more susceptible to other 
externalities, thereby necessitating further empirical investigation.        
 
2.3 Econometrics and Pertinent Studies 
 
Econometric modeling has received considerable attention during the past few 
decades, with applications ranging from forecasting cycles and risk, assessing and analyzing 
the impact of events, and modeling turning points and directional changes. The diverse nature 
of research using econometric techniques in the tourism literature has been highlighted by 
Song and Li (2008), who attempted to expand horizons into new ‘uncharted’ territories of 
empirical investigation. Despite the newfound popularity, to the best of our knowledge, no 
tourism-related study has used econometrics in investigating the effects of non-macro 
incidents on the industry’s stock indices. The vast majority of related studies, which have 
used econometric techniques extensively in their analysis, are derived from the generic 
business, finance and economics literature.   
 
Indicatively, Drakos (2010) used pooled panel ARCH to model the effects of 
terrorism activities on the investor’s psychosocial sentiment. Chesney, Reshetarb, and 
Karamana (2011) used a filtered GARCH–EVT approach to study the impact of incidents on 
stock behavior. Kollias, Papadaumou and Stagiannis (2011) applied the GARCH model to 
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investigate the effects of two major terrorist incidents that occurred in the European 
continent. Essaddam and Karagianis (2014) used GARCH to examine the volatility of stock 
returns following a terrorist event. Peren, Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008, p. 164) explored the 
effect of terrorist attacks on financial markets which “…has not received the same level of 
attention (compared to the short-term effects on major macroeconomic variables)”. It is 
important to note that, despite the methodological similarities, the data used in the studies 
exhibited heterogeneities such that they restrict any attempts to reach definitive and 
comprehensive conclusions. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The primary purpose of the paper is to measure econometrically the effects of 
unexpected non-macro incidents (for example, Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, and War Conflicts1) 
on hospitality/tourism stock indices that are currently trading in international stock markets. 
In particular, five hospitality/tourism-related stock return indices from different regions, 
namely FTSE Travel and Leisure World, FTSE Travel and Leisure Asia Pacific, FTSE Travel 
and Leisure Australia, FTSE Travel and Leisure America, and FTSE Travel and Leisure 
Europe, were selected for analysis from the Thomson Reuters Datastream at a daily 
frequency. These five indices (henceforth H/T indices) cover the vast majority of hospitality, 
tourism, and leisure organizations from around the globe, and so are considered to be ideal 
for our purposes. Their selection was also based on numerous study-specific criteria, such as 
the region covered, years of data coverage (going back to 2000), volume and content.   
 
 Influenced by the methodological specificities of Brown and Warner’s (1985) seminal 
work, which has subsequently been adopted by others (see Brounrn and Derwall 2010), an 
event study method was used to examine the reaction of unexpected non-macro incidents to 
industry-specific stock market indices, rather than on individual company stocks.  Industry 
specific indices summarize stock performance by economic sectors, thereby enabling 
investors and scholars to benchmark, compare and monitor the overall behavior of a 
particular segment, especially its reaction to an event or incident. This method was deemed 
1 Despite being considered in the extant literature as unexpected non-macro incidents, financial crises are 
excluded from the empirical analysis since these events are endogenous shocks on stock markets. It is important 
to reiterate that the aim of the paper is to examine how exogenous shocks (such as wars and terrorist attacks) 
affect stock markets.  
12 
 
                                                          
appropriate since it enables the econometric investigation of the hospitality and tourism 
market sector reactions, both in terms of stock returns and volatility, during and after an 
incident, compared with past averages, and facilitates meaningful comparisons among 
different regions. It is also important to note that the examination of unexpected non-macro 
incidents on individual company stock returns might be misleading due to undesired firm-
specific effects.  
 
A database including one hundred and fifty (150) unexpected non-macro incidents, 
occurring in the World in the 21st Century (January 2000 until February 2016), was manually 
compiled from various Internet sources. The incidents, which represent the most important 
events of the particular time period, were classified into three distinctive categories, namely 
terrorism acts, ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts (day of declaration). With the aim of further 
dissecting the relationship under investigation, thereby enhancing the existing body of 
knowledge by providing a more comprehensive view of stock market reaction to such 
incidents, additional variables were included in the analysis.  
 
In particular, for each incident, data pertaining to its characteristics, namely date, 
category of the event (Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, War conflict), geographic location (country / 
region), tourist fatalities (number), infrastructure/superstructure involved (tourist related, 
such as hotels, restaurants, and airports), type of attack (perpetrators killed or apprehended 
during the attack versus perpetrators that were later apprehended, or are still at large), 
affiliation of the attack (known terrorist organizations versus Lone Wolf attacks), and media 
exposure, were collected.  It is important to indicate that each incident included in the 
database had to be verified from at least two independent sources. Note that some variables 
are not related with all types of incidents (for example, Acts of God).   
 
4. Econometric Models   
 
4.1 Impact of Various Events on Returns and Volatility  
 
As previously stated, the paper investigates the sensitivity of returns and volatility of H/T 
indices in reaction to 150 study-specific unexpected non-macro incidents. In particular, and 
following the discussion in the previous section, we investigate whether there is a change in 
13 
 
the returns and volatility of five (5) major hospitality and tourism stock market indices of 
tourism and hospitability after an unexpected non-macro incident. 
 
Subsequently, a time series analysis is used and the GJR specification of Glosten, 
Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) is used to model the autoregressive daily returns (denoted rt) 
augmented by the appropriate random indicator variables and their conditional variance 
(volatility), denoted ht (also augmented by appropriate random indicator variables).2 The 
GJR specification is an extension of the traditional GARCH model since it accounts for 
asymmetric (that is, whether negative shocks have a greater impact on conditional volatility 
than do positive shocks of the same magnitude), but not leverage effects, whereby negative 
shocks increase conditional volatility and positive shocks decrease conditional volatility (for 
further detail, see McAleer, 2014).  
 
The returns were modelled by an autoregressive process of order 1 to account for 
possible autocorrelation: 
 
1 1 , , ,t t j j t tr c r d uτ τϕ θ−= + + +  (1) 
 
and the conditionally heteroskedastic error term, ut, was assumed to follow the asymmetric 
process according to the GJR(1,1) specification (see McAleer 2014) 3: 
 
t t tu h e= , (2) 
 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , , ,( 0)t t t t t j j th e e e h dτ τω γ α β ξ− − − −= + + < + + . (3) 
 
in which the parameters γ1  and α1 are strictly positive, while β1 lies in the range (-1, 1) as a 
stability condition. 
 
2 The application of a Multivariate GARCH specification that simultaneously models multiple dependent 
variables would possibly be a better method. However, due to the different nature of the research question 
examined, we opted to use the univariate specification. The application of Multivariate GARCH models remains 
an open question for further research.  
3 As the empirical section reveals, a lag order of 1 of the returns specification and GJR(1,1) are adequate to 
remove any possible autocorrelation in the returns and to model volatility, respectively. 
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The innovations, et, are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. In 
order to account for non-normality in the returns shocks, the parameters were estimated by 
the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. 
 
The variables denoted dj,t,τ are dummy variables indicating the existence of an event 
described in the research question j (j=1, 2, …., 7) during period t. It is equal to 1 if there is 
such an event, and 0 otherwise.  The index τ indicates an observation window: 
 
1. Concurrent event period (τ =0) captures the effects of the event on returns and 
volatility on the same date; 
2. A period after the event (τ =1, 2, 3 …) captures the effects of the event on returns and 
volatility in the following days.2 
3.  
If these dummies are significant, it can be inferred that the events described in the research 
questions have impacts on returns and/or volatility. 
 
As for the remaining variables, they are explained as follows: In equation (1), the 
coefficient φ1 captures the lagged effects of the returns (that is, whether the previous day’s 
returns affect current returns), while in equation (3), the coefficients α1 and β1 capture the 
short-run persistence and contribution to the long-run persistence of  shocks to conditional 
volatility. Finally, the coefficient γ1 captures the asymmetry in conditional volatility (that is, 
whether negative shocks have a greater impact on subsequent conditional volatility as 
compared with positive shocks of the same magnitude). 
 
Specifically, the following seven research questions, together with the corresponding 
equations tested, are postulated:   
 
RQ1a: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on H/T stock indices (that is, 
returns and volatility)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Terrorism Terrorism uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
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2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Terrorism Terrorismω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ1b: Do ‘Acts of God’ have a significant effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns 
and volatility)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r GOD GOD uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h GOD GODω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ1c: Do War conflicts (day of declaration) have a significant effect on H/T stock 
indices (that is, returns and volatility)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r War War uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h War Warω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ2: Does the geographic location of the incident of instability affect H/T stocks 
(that is, returns and volatility) in regional and/or global financial markets? 
1 1 1 2 1 3 4 1
5 6 1 7 8 1
9 10 1
                       
                       
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t
r c r Europe Europe America America
ASIA ASIA Australia Australia
Africa Africa u
ϕ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
− + +
+ +
+
= + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ +
 
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 1
5 6 1 7 8 1 9 10 1
( 0)
                        
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
h e e e h Europe Europe America America
ASIA ASIA Australia Australia Africa Africa
ω γ α β ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
− − − − + +
+ + +
= + + < + + + + + +
+ + + + +
 
 
RQ3: What is the impact on H/T stocks from incidents causing tourist fatalities? Is 
there a difference according to the number of fatalities (severity)?  
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1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Victims Victims uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Victims Victimsω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ4: What is the impact on H/T stocks from incidents involving attacks on tourism 
infrastructure / superstructure (such as restaurants, hotels, and airports)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Infrastructure Infrastructure uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Infrastructure Infrastructureω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ5: Does the type of attack [perpetrators killed from suicide attacks or apprehended 
during the attack, versus perpetrators who were later apprehended or are still at large] 
influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns and volatility)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Attack Attack uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Attack Attackω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
RQ6: Does the affiliation of the attackers (known terrorist organization versus Lone 
Wolves) influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns and volatility)?  
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Affiliation Affiliation uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Affiliation Affiliationω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
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RQ7: Does media exposure influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns 
and volatility)? 
1 1 1 2 1t t t t tr c r Media Media uϕ θ θ− += + + + +  
and 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 0)t t t t t t th e e e h Media Mediaω γ α β ξ ξ− − − − += + + < + + + . 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of the five indices are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, 
the average return of each index is positive, with America having the highest value, followed 
by Europe. Uncertainty, as approximated by the standard deviation, varies from 1.18 to 1.55, 
with America depicting the greatest value, followed again by Europe. The distribution of the 
returns suggests negative skewness for all indices, while the positive kurtosis implies that 
returns are leptokurtic. The ARCH test is highly significant, thereby suggesting that second 
moments are likely to experience time-varying dependencies, for which the use of conditional 
volatility models would be deemed useful and convenient. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
5.2 Research Questions 1(a,b,c): Terrorist Attacks, ‘Acts of God’, and Wars impact 
on H/T Stock Indices   
 
The first research question investigates whether terrorist attacks have a significant 
effect on H/T stocks indices, both in terms of returns and volatility (RQ 1a). As shown in 
Table 2, the results indicate a significant negative impact on H/T stock indices in all regions, 
except Australia. In all cases, the indices were not affected by the specific event on day t (the 
day of the terrorist attack), but dropped significantly on the following day.  In comparison, 
the next day drop of European indices was considerably larger (-0,360; p = 0,007) as 
compared with the American, Asia Pacific and World indices. With regard to Australia’s 
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index, which revealed insignificant results, a plausible explanation may revolve around the 
country’s isolated geographical location and national risk, which makes it generally less 
vulnerable and susceptible to such shocks.      
 
When investigating the volatility caused by terrorist attacks on H/T stock indices, 
with the exception of Australia, the results indicate a significant positive impact on the day of 
the event. Volatility is considerably higher for the European stock index, which continued to 
record significant increases on the day following the event, while in the Asia/Pacific this 
dropped the day after the event.  In contrast, despite the volatility increases on the day of the 
event, the World and America indices remained unaffected on the following day. 
  
This behavior may be attributed to the different reactions of each market to specific 
shocks.  Subsequent analysis, using impulse response functions (see the following 
paragraphs), suggest that both the price drop and volatility increase recovered fully to their 
pre-event levels within 2 to 3 days following the incident. Therefore, it is prudent to suggest 
that the overall impact of such shocks is short term4.       
    
INSERT TABLE 2 
  
With similar reasoning, the paper investigated the impact of ‘Acts of God’, widely 
defined as events outside human control, such as tsunami and earthquakes, for which no one 
can be held responsible (RQ1b). Despite the fact that the findings exhibited an overall similar 
trend with terrorist attacks, certain differences are noteworthy (see Table 3). Specifically, 
‘Acts of God’ had a significant negative impact on all five H/T stock indices (returns) on the 
day of the event, which continued on the following day for the World, American and 
European indices. The overall effect for these indices for both days was identical, whereas the 
Asia-Pacific and Australian indices exhibited insignificant drops on the day after the incident.  
With regard to volatility, the findings revealed positive impacts on the day of the event for 
the Asia-Pacific, European, Australian and American stock indices, with the latter two also 
exhibiting significant increases on the following day. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
4 Statistical power analysis for each test is conducted for all estimates. The power of each test is greater than 
80%. 
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 War conflicts (day of declaration) had a much different impact on H/T stock indices 
compared with terrorism incidents and ‘Acts of God’ (RQ1c).  In particular, the findings 
presented in Table 4 revealed that such incidents had a significant negative effect only on the 
World stock index (-0,851; p = 0,027) on the day following the War declaration. The findings 
suggest that the uncertainty surrounding such events (for example, the duration of a War 
conflict, and anticipated human and material/economic losses) minimize stock market shocks 
during the first days of the conflict. In contrast, when investigating the volatility caused by 
such events, the findings portrayed a much different picture since the World, American, and 
European stock indices exhibited a significant increase on the day after, whereas the 
European index also experienced a significant increase on the day of the declaration.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Additional analysis with the use of the Impulse Response Function in an AR process 
was conducted to predict the variable’s movements, given its past.  This technique illustrates 
how the variable responds to a shock of a specific magnitude, and how long it takes to return 
to its original level. The findings shown in Figure 1 suggest that the shock from terrorist 
incidents (RQ1a) lasts for 2 to 3 trading days, a result that is consistent with the significance 
of the estimated (event) parameters. It can be inferred that, although the initial shock of such 
incidents is quite substantial for the first 1-2 days, it dies out in subsequent periods. It is 
important to note that the results are qualitatively similar for the rest of the estimates 
pertaining to ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts (RQ1b and RQ1c - not presented to save 
space). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
5.3 Research Question 2 - Geographic Location of the Incident and H/T Stock 
Indices 
 
The second research question investigated whether the geographic location in terms of 
the five regions (Europe, America, Asia/Pacific, Australia, and Africa) of the actual attack 
impacts the five H/T stock indices. As shown in Table 5, incidents occurring in America 
(mostly in the USA) had a significant negative impact on the World, Australian and 
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American H/T stock indices (note the negative effect at p < 0.10 for the Asia-Pacific and 
Europe). Similarly, incidents occurring in Australia had a negative effect, mostly on the 
following day, on stock indices in Asia-Pacific, Australia and America, whereas European 
events seem to have a significant effect (negative) only on the European index (-0,399; p = 
0,012) on the following day.   
 
Events occurring in Africa and Asia-Pacific did not have any significant effect on any 
of the five indices.  It is apparent that only incidents occurring in America influence 
negatively all H/T indices.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients suggest volatility increases 
(either on the same day of the shock, or on the following day) when events occur in Europe 
or America in almost all markets, whereas there are rather sparse spillover effects when 
events occur in other regions. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
5.4 Research Question 3 – Tourist Casualties and H/T Stock Indices 
 
The third research question investigated the severity of the event, in terms of both reported 
tourist fatalities and their volume. The findings, presented in Table 6, unequivocally indicate 
that incidents with reported tourist fatalities have a significant negative effect in four of the 
five regional indices (except for the Asia-Pacific) on the day following the event, with the 
World and Australian indices exhibiting the largest negative impact. In terms of volatility, 
almost all indices (except Australia) experienced a significant or marginally significant 
positive impact on the day of the event, with the European index recording the highest effect, 
both on both the day of the event and on the following day.         
        
INSERT TABLE 6 
  
The second part of the third question examined whether the number of tourist 
fatalities, a direct reflection of an incident’s severity, impacted upon the H/T stock indices.  
For the empirical analysis, the events were grouped into three distinctive categories, namely 
events with less than 10 fatalities (VICT10), events with 10 to less than 100 fatalities 
(VICT_L100), and events with 100 or more casualties (VICT_G100).  The findings (see 
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Table 7) suggested that the higher is the number of tourist fatalities, the higher is the negative 
impact of these incidents on hospitality and tourism stock indices, especially on the following 
day.  The World, Asia-Pacific, and Australian stock indices exhibited a significant negative 
effect on the day of an event, which caused 100 or more tourist casualties. On the following 
day, almost all three categories negatively impacted the indices, with some minor exceptions 
(for example, events with less than 10 casualties have an insignificant effect on the Asia- 
Pacific, Australian, American and European indices).   
 
It is important to note that, on average, the impacts of incidents with more than 10 and 
less than 100 victims were more than double compared with the corresponding impact of 
incidents with less than 10 victims. Interestingly, the impact of incidents with 100 or more 
victims was more than three times higher than the corresponding impact of incidents with 
more than 10 and less than 100 victims.  Finally, in terms of volatility, all five stock indices 
experienced significant positive effects, both on the day of the event, and on the following 
day, with the Asia-Pacific and European indices being more vulnerable to such events.    
  
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
5.5 Research Question 4: Attacks on Tourism Infrastructure / Superstructure and 
H/T Stock Indices  
 
Historically, the industry’s infrastructure/superstructure (such as airports, hotels, 
restaurants, and leisure venues) have been ideal targets. Nevertheless, the actual impact of 
such attacks on H/T stock indices has received limited scholarly attention. The findings (see 
Table 8) suggest that attacks on tourism infrastructure cause a significant negative impact on 
most indices (except for the Asia-Pacific), mostly on the day following the event. The 
European index seems the most susceptible to such attacks, especially on the following day (-
0,581; p = 0,001), a trend that is also evident with regard to volatility. Such attacks caused a 
significant positive impact on the corresponding uncertainty of these markets in all regions, 
again with the European and Asia-Pacific indices recording the highest volatility increases.    
       
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
5.6 Research Question 5: Type of Attack and H/T Stock Indices  
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 The fifth research question explored whether the type of attack influences H/T stock 
indices. For this purpose, attacks were classified into two distinct categories according to the 
perpetrators’ fate, namely killed or apprehended during the attack (such as suicide bombers), 
and perpetrators who were later apprehended or were still at large. The results, shown in 
Table 9, indicate that the type of attack was relevant only for the European index, with a 
significant negative impact on the following day of the event (-0,380; p = 0,005). It is 
apparent that the type of attack has no direct impact on the other regions’ indices, whereas a 
significant positive impact on stock market uncertainty is revealed in the World (on the day 
of the attack), Asia-Pacific and European indices, again with the latter recording the highest 
increase for both days.   
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
5.7 Research Question 6: Affiliation of the Attackers and H/T Stock Indices 
 
The recent literature (Aslam and Kang 2015) suggests that the specificities of a 
terrorist attack influence its overall impact on financial markets. In order to explore this 
argument further, the affiliation of the attackers, classified into known terrorist organizations 
(such as Al-Qaeda) and Lone Wolves, was examined. A Lone Wolf is defined as an 
individual who commits an act of violence alone without any logistical support from an 
organized group, despite the fact that they may espouse a radical ideology (for example, the 
2015 Copenhagen shootings). The findings, presented in Table 10, suggest that the attackers’ 
affiliation is not relevant to any of the five indices under consideration, as no significant 
changes are recorded. In contrast, when investigating a market’s volatility, significant 
positive increases are revealed for both the Asia-Pacific and European indices, both on the 
day of the event and on the following day.     
 
INSERT TABLE 10 
 
5.8 Research Question 7: Media Exposure and H/T Stock Indices 
 
The final research question examined whether post-event media coverage impacts on 
H/T stock indices, both in terms of returns and volatility. Each event’s media coverage and 
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exposure was classified as either High/Global or Low/Regional, based on information 
received from various Internet sources. The subjective nature of this exercise is dutifully 
acknowledged, so that the results are presented for illustrative purposes. The findings (see 
Table 11) indicated that media exposure had a significant negative impact on the four indices 
(except for the Asia-Pacific), mostly on the day following the incident. With regard to market 
uncertainty (volatility), all five indices experienced a significant increase, mostly on the day 
following the event, with the European index seen as the most susceptible to such an effect.  
 
INSERT TABLE 11 
 
5.9 Half-life Volatility Shocks 
 
In an attempt to further investigate the volatility shock persistence for each of the 
seven research questions, the half-life method, defined as ln(0.5)/ ln(a2 + b2), which measures 
the period of time (or number of days) it takes for the shock’s impact to decrease by one-half, 
was used. The particular technique has been used by numerous scholars (see, for example, 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes 1990) for dissecting the behavior of volatility after a particular 
incident. The findings, presented in Table 12, suggest that volatility shocks, similar to returns, 
appear to be largely transitory in nature, with half-life estimates being around 4 to 5 days for 
most events. Noteworthy differences do exist, both between the five indices under 
consideration, particularly regarding the Asia-Pacific index, and according to the 
characteristics of the incidents.    
 
INSERT TABLE 12 
 
6. Discussion and Implications  
 
Aligned with existing generic business literature (Brounrn and Derwall 2010; 
Chesney et al. 2011; Drakos 2010), the findings suggest that unexpected non-macro incidents 
caused a short-term transitory effect on H/T stock indices, with recovery occurring within 
two to three days.  As revealed, noteworthy differences exist according to the incident type, 
with terrorist attacks recording statistically the most significant drops, especially on the day 
following the event, and ‘Acts of God’ exhibiting drops on the day of the incident.  In 
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contrast, Wars had an insignificant effect on four of the five study-specific indices (except for 
the World index).  
 
The specificities of each event were explored with the use of a number of variables, 
such as geographic location, severity, specific target, type of the attack, perpetrators’ 
affiliation, and post-event media exposure and coverage, in order to provide a more holistic 
overview of their effect. The literature (see Aslam and Kang 2015; Chesney, Reshetarb, and 
Karamana 2011; Essaddam and Karagianis 2014) suggests that the characteristics of each 
incident influence its overall impact on both stock market returns and volatility. Thus, an 
enhanced understanding of these parameter estimates would most certainly assist 
stakeholders in predicting the financial consequences of an incident, as well as instigating 
recovery initiatives. The findings suggest that only incidents occurring in the USA have a 
global impact on almost all indices, whereas other incidents mostly affect regional stock 
markets. In terms of severity (referred to in some studies as the intensity of the incident), the 
findings indicate that events resulting in tourist casualties have a significant negative impact 
on all five indices, whereas this impact was exponentially higher for incidents with more than 
100 fatalities.  
 
Incidents involving attacks on tourism infrastructure and superstructure had a 
significant negative effect on the World, European and American indices, mostly on the day 
following the event. This tends to support Brounrn and Derwall’s (2010) argument that 
industries that are directly affected, or are involved in the attack, experience considerably 
stronger effects.  The type of terrorist attack was also investigated, with research (see Eldor 
and Melnick 2004; Kollias et al. 2011) suggesting a number of different scenarios. For 
instance, Kollias et al. (2011) argued that stock behavior and the subsequent recovery period 
may be affected by the type of the attack, with London (2004) presented as an example of a 
single day recovery due to the incident’s nature (suicide bombings), compared with the 
Madrid attacks in 2005 (where the perpetrators were apprehended a few days later). These 
empirical findings suggest that the European index is significantly more susceptible to this 
type of attack, both in terms of returns and volatility.             
 
The affiliation of the perpetrators was investigated, with the reasoning being that 
attacks conducted by known terrorist groups will have a longer lasting impact as compared 
with Lone Wolf incidents. The findings fail to confirm this argument as no significant 
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changes were recorded in any of the five indices. In contrast, market uncertainty is 
significantly higher for both the Asia-Pacific and the European indices, thereby suggesting 
that both regions are more vulnerable if the perpetrators’ affiliation is a well-known terrorist 
group. Finally, and as expected, the sustained effects of media coverage, a pragmatic reality 
when incidents cause international tourists fatalities, influences the event’s overall impact, 
both on returns and volatility.        
 
With minor exceptions, volatility exhibits similar reactions to returns. The half-life 
volatility shock persistence estimates revealed some noteworthy differences, especially 
between the Asia-Pacific and the other indices. Nevertheless, in comparison with the existing 
literature, this paper was unable to provide evidence to support claims that, following a 
particular incident, volatility will be significantly increased for up to 15 days (as suggested by 
Essaddam and Karagianis 2014), or that ‘Acts of God’ increase uncertainty more, as 
compared with other incidents, due to the observed post-event negative impact (as noted by 
Chesney et al. 2011).  It would be prudent to encourage further empirical investigation in 
volatility persistence following such incidents.   
     
6.1 Implications for the Hospitality and Tourism Industry  
 
Sustainable tourism development requires private initiatives and optimum financial 
and investment practices, all of which can be severely disrupted by unexpected non-macro 
incidents. De Sausmarez (2007, p. 701) suggested that such incidents “…jeopardize (tourism) 
development not only by the damage they inflict but also by their unpredictability”, whereas 
Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2010) highlight their adverse effect on stock market’s sentiment, and 
hence the behavior of individual stock investors. This paper provides a more thorough 
overview of stock market reactions to such eventualities, thereby providing comprehensive 
information that is of substantial value to industry stakeholders.  
 
The capability of financial institutions to predict both the likelihood and probable 
consequences of unexpected non-macro incidents is crucial in today’s business environment. 
With the use of an appropriate econometric methodology, this paper enhanced our conceptual 
knowledge as to how the characteristics of each incident (such as type, location, severity, and 
affiliation) affect stock market reactions and behavior, particularly those of the five study-
specific H/T stock indices. Overall, our findings exhibited some similarities with previous 
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studies that investigated pertinent topics in generic business indices (see Brounrn and Derwall 
2010; Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010). Nevertheless, noteworthy implications are of interest to 
individual investors who are contemplating H/T stock investments, financial institutions, 
local authorities, tourism-service providers (for example, tour operators), and industry 
operators.      
 
In particular, the findings revealed that the negative impact of non-macro incidents on 
H/T stock indices (returns) is short lived and does not last more than 2-3 days. With the 
exception of cataclysmic events, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, or the 
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which had an unprecedented psychological 
impact on financial markets caused by the nature, magnitude, and severity of the incident 
(Drakos 2004), financial markets appeared to be efficient and resilient in absorbing the initial 
shock of such incidents. It is apparent that recent past experiences have ‘forced’ the industry 
to create its own ‘antibodies’ in order to self-protect and immune itself to such eventualities. 
A contributing factor was the fact that, following the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, the majority of financial markets, especially those operating in developed countries, 
undertook drastic measures in enhancing their contingency plans and crisis management 
responses in order to mitigate their exposure and vulnerability to such eventualities (Kollias 
et al. 2011).  
  
In contrast to stock returns, market uncertainty (volatility) is still a contested topic that 
is worthy of further investigation. Note that for investors, high market volatility will severely 
limit the well-established benefits of portfolio diversification, an ideal investment practice for 
the global tourism industry, especially at the international level (Lee, Wu, and Wang 2007; 
McAleer 2015). Moreover, this short-term transient effect seems to be inconsistent with some 
recent calls (see Chesney et al. 2011) to avoid investing in hospitality and tourism related 
stocks due to terrorist-related incidents.  
 
 The profile of the incident and its geographic location may assist financial institutions 
in better quantifying their risk exposure. For tourism, incidents occurring in developed 
countries (mostly in Europe and the USA) that cause tourist fatalities, involve the industry’s 
infrastructure and superstructure and, logically, generate extensive media coverage, thereby 
influencing individuals’ psycho-social state, require immediate attention as they can have a 
significant impact on markets. In contrast, terrorist incidents occurring in Africa, a 
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troublesome geostrategic region with numerous ‘active’ conflict zones (for example, Somalia, 
Yemen, and Libya, among others) have an insignificant effect on the study-specific indices.  
 
 At the destination level, the findings have implications for tourism policymakers who 
are striving to mitigate the negative impact from such events. Depending on the type, impact, 
severity, and location of the incident, stakeholders may undertake specific measures that 
minimize their risk exposure and safeguard the sustainability of their industry. The 
development of pre- and post-event strategies, and the adoption of specific measures by the 
destination’s highest institutions, both political and financial (such as Government, Central 
Bank, Local Authorities, and Regional Stock Markets), will enhance the confidence and trust 
of current and potential investors, and safeguard the industry’s financial interests. 
Furthermore, tourism organizations may undertake pro-active strategic market diversification 
initiatives, which may encourage, for example, the promotion of domestic tourism at 
destinations that are overly dependent on international markets, thereby minimizing their 
susceptibility to unexpected incidents, such as terrorism.   
 
For the past decade or more, numerous scholars (see, for example, Chan, Lim, and 
McAleer 2005; Paraskevas, Altinay, McLean, and Cooper 2013) have argued that the severity 
of instability incidents and their associated economic ramifications of conducting day-to-day 
business (Chen and Siems 2004), necessitate industry-specific research that expands the 
collective conceptual capital in metrics and controls, both of which are essential in managing 
knowledge in tourism crises. This novel investigation provides an insightful view into the 
behavior and reaction of industry specific stock indices, at five different regions, following 
unexpected non-macro incidents.  
 
Moreover, the inclusion of additional variables portraying the characteristics of each 
incident provides a more holistic overview of this relationship, and highlights numerous 
topics that are worthy of further empirical investigation. Possible topics include the 
conceptualization and development of an advanced model of predicting H/T stock behavior 
following a particular incident, and the investigation of the indirect and systemic effects of 
unexpected non-macro incidents, effects that cannot be reflected in the next day’s stock 
market prices and returns. Finally, the authors acknowledge that the use of the manually 
compiled list of 150 incidents may be scrutinized by some, which would be a most welcome 
initiative.  
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Endnotes 
1 The innovations, et , are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. In order to 
account for non-normality in the returns shocks, the parameters were estimated by quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML). 
2 In practice, only the day after the event has an effect on either returns or volatility, so that in 
estimation we used only τ =0 and τ =1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Mean 0.015 0.003 0.007 0.022 0.016 
Std. Dev. 1.189 1.238 1.181 1.549 1.494 
Skewness -0.229 -0.316 -0.390 -0.155 -0.177 
Kurtosis 13.346 8.908 7.397 11.212 8.160 
ARCH test 21.164 38.629 41.554 19.183 33.412 
 
(0) (0) 0) (0) (0) 
Observations 4219 4219 4219 4219 4219 
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 Table 2. Terrorism Incidents and H/T Stock Indices 
 
WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean 
    C 0,030 0,024 0,046 0,039 0,040 
 
(0,040*) (0,180) (0,050*) (0,091) (0,426) 
FTSE(-1) 0,096 0,003 0,017 -0,010 0,055 
(p value) (0,002**) (0,929) (0,471) (0,502) (0,027*) 
TERRORISM 0,022 -0,105 -0,127 -0,069 -0,126 
(p value) (0,899) (0,645) (0,297) (0,587) (0,258) 
TERRORISM(1) -0,131 -0,301 -0,195 -0,202 -0,360 
(p value) (0,017*) (0,049*) (0,128) (0,034*) (0,007**) 
Results - Variance 
    C 0,012 0,023 0,028 0,027 1,300 
 
(0,007**) (0,002**) (0,007**) (0,001**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,044 0,033 0,021 0,072 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,079 0,048 0,066 0,094 0,011 
GARCH(-1) 0,939 0,925 0,930 0,941 0,588 
TERRORISM 0,214 0,516 -0,009 0,227 0,836 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,004**) (0,935) (0,054) (0,009**) 
TERRORISM(1) -0,071 -0,306 0,130 -0,009 1,461 
(p value) (0,280) (0,004**) (0,584) (0,946) (0,006**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01
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Table 3. ‘Acts of God’ and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean     
C 0,033 0,030 0,005 0,030 0,028 
 (0,058) (0,170) (1,008) (0,171) (0,091) 
FTSE(-1) 0,096 -0,003 0,025 -0,005 0,053 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,821) (0,482) (0,548) (0,004**) 
GOD -1,285 -0,990 -0,168 -1,167 -1,183 
(p value) (0,012*) (0,026*) (0,044*) (0,013*) (0,031*) 
GOD(1) -1,072 -0,725 -0,159 -1,290 -1,048 
(p value) (0,017*) (0,077) (0,672) (0,018*) (0,044*) 
Results - Variance     
C 0,013 0,018 1,859 0,024 0,029 
 (0,009**) (0,008**) (0,002**) (0,009**) 0,009 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,047 -0,030 0,015 0,029 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,081 0,051 0,099 0,098 0,121 
GARCH(-1) 0,945 0,922 0,567 0,933 0,913 
GOD -0,356 1,192 2,745 2,007 1,085 
(p value) (0,851) (0,020*) (0,005**) (0,011*) (0,014*) 
GOD(1) 0,615 -0,538 2,752 2,130 -1,054 
(p value) (0,757) (0,486) (0,066) (0,013*) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 4. Wars and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,041 0,026 0,029 0,021 0,039 
 (0,025*) (0,202) (0,282) (0,329) (0,067) 
FTSE(-1) 0,098 0,006 0,011 -0,006 0,047 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,914) (0,914) (0,664) (0,025*) 
WAR 0,474 0,419 -0,456 1,465 0,191 
(p value) (0,783) (0,468) (0,584) (0,324) (0,795) 
WAR(1) -0,851 -1,015 0,438 -1,119 0,288 
(p value) (0,027*) (0,109) (0,713) (0,229) (0,823) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,188 0,018 0,585 0,142 0,032 
 (0,002**) (0,002**) (0,007**) (0,003**) (0,008**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,091 0,047 0,186 0,108 0,024 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,419 0,051 0,275 0,244 0,121 
GARCH(-1) 0,614 0,918 0,434 0,753 0,912 
WAR 9,965 0,120 -1,032 9,995 2,078 
(p value) (0,058) (0,958) (0,246) (0,083) (0,050*) 
WAR(1) -0,728 -0,002 -0,092 -1,950 -0,880 
(p value) (0,010*) (1,002) (0,833) (0,004**) (0,004**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Figure 1. Impulse Response Function 
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 Table 5. Geographic Location and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
FTSE(-1) 0,096 0,008 0,012 -0,016 0,054 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,832) (0,660) (0,375) (0,051) 
EUROPE -0,022 0,127 0,061 0,011 -0,117 
(p value) (0,906) (0,527) (0,833) (0,973) (0,055) 
EUROPE(1) -0,540 -0,306 -0,082 0,005 -0,399 
(p value) (0,070) (0,253) (0,747) (0,987) (0,012*) 
AMERICA -0,480 -0,889 -0,512 -0,820 -0,108 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,063) (0,043*) (0,034*) (0,785) 
AMERICA(1) -0,468 -0,235 -0,416 -0,575 -0,363 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,645) (0,014*) (0,012*) (0,067) 
ASIA -0,259 -0,234 -0,455 -0,088 -0,020 
(p value) (0,178) (0,143) (0,137) (0,764) (0,904) 
ASIA(1) 0,280 0,209 -0,009 0,108 -0,138 
(p value) (0,558) (0,517) (0,983) (0,598) (0,673) 
AUSTRALIA -1,475 -0,700 -0,341 -1,813 -0,443 
(p value) (0,764) (0,876) (0,650) (0,288) (0,396) 
AUSTRALIA(1) -1,702 -0,756 -1,882 -3,101 -1,069 
(p value) (0,638) (0,046*) (0,036*) (0,007**) (0,065) 
AFRICA 0,027 -0,120 -0,112 0,065 -0,017 
(p value) (0,925) (0,508) (0,580) (0,676) (0,887) 
AFRICA(1) -0,026 0,045 -0,107 -0,049 -0,365 
(p value) (0,903) (0,862) (0,727) (0,725) (0,188) 
Results - Variance      
C 1,172 1,255 1,335 0,568 1,396 
 (0,001**) (0,000**) (0,005**) (0,008**) (0,009**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,035 0,046 0,038 0,144 0,071 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,060 0,030 0,034 0,213 0,011 
GARCH(-1) 0,577 0,588 0,577 0,581 0,588 
EUROPE 0,697 0,956 0,951 0,082 0,870 
(p value) (0,057) (0,007**) (0,466) (0,879) (0,017*) 
EUROPE(1) 1,005 1,275 1,278 0,154 1,205 
(p value) (0,016*) (0,004**) (0,223) (0,793) (0,001**) 
AMERICA 2,009 0,515 0,520 1,558 1,646 
(p value) (0,019*) (0,482) (0,757) (0,056) (0,020*) 
AMERICA(1) 2,635 2,669 2,677 0,304 2,263 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,006**) (0,002**) (0,098) (0,025*) 
ASIA 0,965 1,460 1,461 1,442 1,219 
(p value) (0,088) (0,006**) (0,713) (0,021*) (0,012*) 
ASIA(1) 0,627 0,781 0,789 0,943 0,744 
(p value) (0,494) (0,134) (0,442) (0,007**) (0,201) 
AUSTRALIA 0,231 0,275 0,273 0,701 0,014 
42 
 
(p value) (0,988) (0,884) (0,553) (0,605) (0,998) 
AUSTRALIA(1) 2,256 2,691 2,695 1,365 3,542 
(p value) (0,921) (0,214) (0,012*) (0,640) (0,008**) 
AFRICA 1,106 1,158 1,156 0,605 0,117 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,004**) (0,011*) (0,110) (0,122) 
AFRICA(1) 0,737 1,007 1,004 0,415 0,138 
(p value) (0,037*) (0,009**) (0,130) (0,208) (0,127) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 6. H/T Stock Indices and Tourist Fatalities 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,030 0,010 0,035 0,026 0,030 
 (0,027*) (0,175) (0,051) (0,086) (0,025*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,086 -0,006 0,011 -0,011 0,031 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,885) (0,454) (0,514) (0,016*) 
Tourist Victims 0,055 -0,061 -0,097 -0,029 0,035 
(p value) (0,675) (0,630) (0,581) (0,871) 0,819 
Tourist Victims(1) -0,308 -0,200 -0,309 -0,434 -0,723 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,074) (0,005**) (0,019*) (0,019*) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,000 0,014 0,022 0,014 0,012 
 (0,003**) (0,009**) (0,003**) (0,008**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,009 0,042 0,018 0,002 0,001 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,073 0,044 0,058 0,088 0,096 
GARCH(-1) 0,932 0,915 0,924 0,932 0,921 
Tourist Victims 0,144 0,346 0,059 0,144 1,695 
(p value) (0,011*) (0,005**) (0,079) (0,046*) (0,001**) 
Tourist Victims(1) 0,017 -0,163 0,088 0,112 2,105 
(p value) (0,832) (0,180) (0,737) (0,059) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 7. Severity (number of tourist casualties) and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,032 -0,004 0,045 0,033 0,013 
 (0,027*) (0,979) (0,021*) (0,071) (0,558) 
FTSE(-1) 0,085 -0,004 0,004 -0,019 0,040 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,847) (0,517) (0,492) (0,038*) 
VICT10 0,031 -0,304 -0,127 -0,056 0,088 
(p value) (0,900) (0,028*) (0,059) (0,776) (0,781) 
VICT_L100 0,023 0,000 -0,206 -0,051 -0,031 
(p value) (0,836) (0,988) (0,026*) (0,802) (0,798) 
VICT_G100 -0,195 -0,539 -0,247 -0,089 0,015 
(p value) (0,035*) (0,009**) (0,049*) (0,690) (0,969) 
VICT10(1) -0,122 -0,111 0,001 -0,353 -0,173 
(p value) (0,026*) (0,068) (0,966) (0,102) (0,065) 
VICT_L100(1) -0,208 -0,248 -0,205 -0,451 -0,416 
(p value) (0,099) (0,019*) (0,030*) (0,083) (0,002**) 
VICT_G100(1) -0,646 -0,512 -0,634 -0,709 -0,465 
(p value) (0,003**) (0,020*) (0,013*) (0,058) (0,001**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,005 1,150 0,020 0,023 0,866 
 (0,009**) (0,009**) (0,005**) (0,002**) (0,004**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,008 0,052 0,019 0,019 0,049 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,085 0,045 0,051 0,099 0,119 
GARCH(-1) 0,942 0,572 0,921 0,934 0,574 
VICT10 0,287 0,636 0,554 0,182 1,159 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,034*) (0,016*) (0,028*) (0,042*) 
VICT_L100 0,279 0,807 0,070 0,531 0,639 
(p value) (0,024*) (0,004**) (0,841) (0,014*) (0,010*) 
VICT_G100 0,206 1,350 0,791 0,583 1,279 
(p value) (0,066) (0,005**) (0,023*) (0,051) (0,021*) 
VICT10(1) 0,244 1,294 0,310 0,139 2,235 
(p value) (0,009**) (0,004**) (0,036*) (0,048*) (0,005**) 
VICT_L100(1) 0,081 0,960 0,264 0,176 1,265 
(p value) (0,507) (0,009**) (0,095) (0,047*) (0,008**) 
VICT_G100(1) 0,381 0,688 0,725 0,873 0,643 
(p value) (0,039*) (0,003**) (0,026*) (0,029*) (0,008**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 8. Attacks on Tourism Infrastructure H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,033 0,009 0,030 0,044 0,037 
 (0,022*) (0,748) (0,044*) (0,060) (0,007**) 
FTSE(-1) 0,089 0,001 0,012 -0,016 0,034 
(p value) (0,010*) (0,909) (0,464) (0,519) (0,021*) 
Infrastructure -0,049 -0,212 -0,111 -0,183 -0,005 
(p value) (0,648) (0,002**) (0,363) (0,163) (0,997) 
Infrastructure(1) -0,228 0,005 -0,255 -0,316 -0,581 
(p value) (0,013*) (0,922) (0,087) (0,041*) (0,001**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,006 1,062 0,031 0,009 0,013 
 (0,000**) (0,003**) (0,010*) (0,008**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,053 0,030 0,015 0,007 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,082 0,051 0,061 0,101 0,101 
GARCH(-1) 0,928 0,556 0,932 0,925 0,926 
Infrastructure 0,167 1,063 0,155 0,234 1,088 
(p value) (0,023*) (0,006**) (0,042*) (0,013*) (0,003**) 
Infrastructure(1) -0,010 0,871 0,081 0,051 1,434 
(p value) (0,926) (0,002**) (0,080) (0,790) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01  
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 Table 9. Type of Attack and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,034 0,027 0,044 0,029 0,024 
 (0,040*) (0,141) (0,042*) (0,101) (0,653) 
FTSE(-1) 0,087 0,000 0,004 -0,017 0,053 
(p value) (0,002**) (0,849) (0,473) (0,503) (0,040*) 
Attack -0,036 -0,131 -0,196 -0,152 -0,114 
(p value) (0,710) (0,216) (0,127) (0,323) (0,413) 
Attack(1) -0,087 -0,094 -0,190 -0,137 -0,380 
(p value) (0,398) (0,288) (0,144) (0,278) (0,005**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,002 0,025 0,025 0,022 1,401 
 (0,000**) (0,001**) (0,008**) (0,004**) (0,007**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,014 0,036 0,036 0,012 0,066 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,072 0,041 0,052 0,086 0,032 
GARCH(-1) 0,936 0,917 0,937 0,924 0,594 
Attack 0,240 0,291 0,137 0,220 0,769 
(p value) (0,008**) (0,008**) (0,543) (0,196) (0,000**) 
Attack(1) 0,115 0,231 -0,025 -0,007 1,703 
(p value) (0,134) (0,003**) (0,916) (0,977) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 10. Affiliation of Attackers and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,025 0,010 0,038 0,019 0,032 
 (0,078) (0,920) (0,100) (0,173) (0,026*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,097 -0,023 0,008 -0,016 0,041 
(p value) (0,008**) (0,007**) (0,449) (0,558) (0,020*) 
Affiliation 0,165 -0,116 0,072 -0,151 0,139 
(p value) (0,285) (0,057) (0,663) (0,439) (0,367) 
Affiliation(1) -0,091 -0,098 0,007 -0,194 -0,535 
(p value) (0,488) (0,139) (0,986) (0,302) (0,082) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,001 0,758 0,021 0,019 0,024 
 (0,002**) (0,006**) (0,001**) (0,000**) (0,009**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,012 0,094 0,031 0,001 0,017 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,074 0,086 0,054 0,087 0,103 
GARCH(-1) 0,947 0,349 0,935 0,942 0,914 
Affiliation 0,101 0,618 0,339 0,096 1,376 
(p value) (0,394) (0,007**) (0,208) (0,739) (0,005**) 
Affiliation(1) 0,010 0,853 0,252 0,128 1,618 
(p value) (0,900) (0,004**) (0,351) (0,627) (0,003**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
  
48 
 
 Table 11. Media Exposure and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA-PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,029 0,025 0,040 0,033 0,043 
 (0,031*) (0,145) (0,055) (0,077) (0,026*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,089 0,005 0,011 -0,008 0,043 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,777) (0,489) (0,543) (0,029*) 
Media -0,073 -0,231 -0,179 -0,149 -0,207 
(p value) (0,561) (0,064) (0,025*) (0,046*) (0,025*) 
Media(1) -0,373 -0,162 -0,323 -0,488 -0,870 
(p value) (0,000**) (0,176) (0,017*) (0,021*) (0,014*) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,016 0,018 0,013 0,020 0,011 
 (0,008**) (0,003**) (0,002**) (0,001**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,035 0,025 0,000 0,013 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,082 0,046 0,063 0,087 0,109 
GARCH(-1) 0,936 0,909 0,926 0,928 0,913 
Media 0,026 0,351 0,234 -0,059 1,165 
(p value) (0,086) (0,007**) (0,046*) (0,892) (0,002**) 
Media(1) 0,207 0,114 0,484 0,488 1,562 
(p value) (0,026*) (0,042*) (0,025*) (0,014*) (0,006**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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 Table 12. Half-life of Volatility Shocks Persistence 
 Region 
W/O  
dummies 
RQ1a 
(Terrorism) 
RQ1b 
(‘Acts of 
God’) 
RQ1c 
(War 
Conflicts) 
RQ2 
(Geograph. 
Location) 
RQ3_fatal 
(Tourist 
Fatalities) 
RQ3_tour
_vic 
(Number 
of Victims) 
RQ4 
(Infrastr. / 
Superstr.) 
RQ5 
(Type of 
Attack) 
RQ6 
(Affiliation) 
RQ7 
(Media 
Coverage) 
WORLD 95.139 5.513 6.098 0.728 0.632 5.755 4.890 4.680 5.219 6.382 5.249 
ASIA PAC 152.826 4.503 4.325 4.118 0.656 0.625 3.934 0.596 4.023 0.340 3.680 
AUSTRALIA 45.331 4.842 0.612 0.462 0.632 4.228 4.424 4.946 5.388 5.241 4.513 
AMERICA 71.438 5.716 5.019 1.267 0.676 5.058 4.907 4.475 4.419 5.835 4.656 
EUROPE 31.226 0.662 3.844 3.777 0.661 0.628 4.185 4.537 0.673 3.847 3.834 
Note: Period of time (Number of days) 
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